Consider a universal oracle Turing machine that prints a finite or an infinite binary sequence, based on the answers to the binary queries that it makes during the computation. We study the probability that this output is infinite and computable when the machine is given a random (in the probabilistic sense) stream of bits as the answers to its queries during an infinitary computation. Surprisingly, we find that these probabilities are the entire class of real numbers in (0, 1) that can be written as the difference of two halting probabilities relative to the halting problem. In particular, there are universal Turing machines that produce a computable infinite output with probability exactly 1/2. Our results contrast a large array of facts (the most well-known being the randomness of Chaitin's halting probability) that witness maximal initial segment complexity of probabilities associated with universal machines. Our proof uses recent advances in algorithmic randomness.
alphabet and performs a computation according to the answers it receives to the oracle-queries that it poses. Such a computation may halt (perhaps with some string written on an output tape) or may continue indefinitely. If we run the machine, and during the computation we answer the adaptive queries that appear in a random manner (providing random bits as the answers), then we may consider the probability that the machine halts. 1 Chaitin [12] showed that the binary expansion of this real number is algorithmically random, in the classic sense of Martin-Löf [26] .
Subsequent work 2 revealed the algorithmic randomness of a variety of probabilities associated with universal computations, using an approach that establishes the maximum possible level of algorithmic randomness that is possible given the arithmetical complexity of the associated properties. As we elaborate in Section 2.1, this methodology also provided characterizations of the probabilities in purely algorithmic terms, while a number of examples have been noticed where it is not applicable.
The machine model. In the present article, we consider oracle Turing machines M working on the binary alphabet as input/output devices, which take as input the oracle stream X and eventually (perhaps after infinitely many steps) output a contiguous (i.e., without gaps) finite or infinite binary sequence M (X ) on its one-way output tape. 3 We are interested in the probability that the output U (X ) of a universal oracle Turing machine U is a total (i.e., infinite) computable stream, when using a random oracle X . Here the oracle is regarded as a random variable (in the sense of probability, not algorithmic randomness), and the probability of an event is the measure of oracles X for which this event occurs when U runs with oracle X . Theorem 1.1 (Main Result). The probability that the output U (X ) of a (universal) oracle Turing machine U is total and computable when reading from a random oracle has the form α − β, where α, β are 0 -left-c.e. reals. Conversely, given α, β as above such that α − β ∈ (0, 1), there exists a universal oracle Turing machine U such that the output U (X ) is total and computable with probability exactly α − β. Remark 1.2 (D.c.e. reals) . We note that the differences of left-c.e. reals, also known as d.c.e. reals, form a field under the usual addition and multiplication, as was demonstrated by Ambos-Spies, Weihrauch, and Zheng [1] . Raichev [33] and Ng [29] showed that this field is real-closed. More recently, Miller [27] developed a theory of derivation on the d.c.e. reals, generalizing a result from Reference [4] which will be crucial in the proof of our main result. The same facts hold by direct relativization for the class of reals in Theorem 1.1, namely the class of differences of 0 -left-c.e. reals.
Remark 1.3 (Significance of binary output alphabet).
The fact that we restrict our machines to the binary alphabet is crucial for our methods and even for our results. The motivated reader is referred to Becher and Grigorieff [9, Theorem 9.4 ] which refers to machines with infinite output alphabet and contrasts our Theorem 1.1. For example, the rather simple argument of Section 3.1 relies on the fact that our output alphabet is binary.
The Probability of a Computable Output from a Random Oracle
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It follows from Theorem 1.1 that, although the property that U (X ) is total and computable is Σ 0 3 -complete when U is universal, its probability can be as simple as 1/2 and as complicated as Martin-Löf random or even Martin-Löf random relative to the halting problem. Corollary 1.4. There is a universal oracle Turing machine U such that the probability that the output U (X ) is total and computable is 1/2.
The contrast here is that the complexity of a universal machine in combination with a nontrivial Σ 0 3 -complete property does not necessarily transfer to the probability of this property. As we are going to explain later, there are two main nontrivial reasons for this phenomenon:
• properties of bases for Martin-Löf randomness;
• properties of differences of universal halting probabilities. 4 An oracle X is a base for Martin-Löf randomness if it is computed by another oracle that is Martin-Löf random relative to X . This class was introduced by Kučera [21] and has been studied extensively since. First, we will use the fact from Hirschfeldt, Nies, and Stephan [19] that bases for Martin-Löf randomness are computable from the halting problem to show that the probability in Theorem 1.1 is the same as the probability of another property that has simpler arithmetical complexity, namely that of being defined as the disjunction of a Π 0 2 and a Σ 0 2 formula. This will be sufficient for one direction of the characterization in Theorem 1.1. For the other direction, we will use a property of differences of universal halting probabilities that was recently discovered in Reference [4] . A simple way to state this property is that if α, β are universal halting probabilities and q > 1 is a rational number, then at least one of α − β, q · α − β is Martin-Löf random and either a left-c.e. or a right-c.e. real.
Overview of this Article
After the background and terminology of Section 1.2, we briefly discuss previous work in the literature regarding the algorithmic randomness of probabilities of universal machines in Section 2.1. The point we are making here is that the characterization given in our result, Theorem 1.1, presents a new paradigm in relation to the existing work on the algorithmic randomness of probabilities of machines. In Section 2.2, we briefly discuss a universal probability in the context of formal systems and Chaitin's popular metamathematical considerations. We point out that the probability that a universal machine will produce an undecidable sentence of Peano arithmetic is a Martin-Löf random left-c.e. real. This probability is of the form α − β for two Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals α, β, just like the property of Theorem 1.1. However, it behaves very differently, since it can always be approximated computably from the left (a consequence of the recent work in Reference [4] ). This example provides further context for our main result and shows that a natural property that can be expressed as the difference of two Σ 0 n classes does not necessarily admit a probability characterization such as the one given in Theorem 1.1. Finally Section 3 contains the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Background, Notation, and Terminology
The reader will need to be familiar with the basic notions of computability theory and the definition of Martin-Löf randomness [26] . Let ∅ (n) be the nth iteration of the halting set and let 0 (n) be its Turing degree. Let ∅ also denote the halting problem and let 0 denote the degree of the halting problem. For each n > 0, we say that a real is n-random if it is Martin-Löf random relative to ∅ (n−1) .
A real is called left-c.e. if it is the limit of a computable increasing sequence of rational numbers. Similarly, a real is called right-c.e. if it is the limit of a computable decreasing sequence of rational numbers. These notions relativize with respect to ∅ (n) for each n > 0. In the present article, the 0 -left-c.e. and the 0 -right-c.e. reals will be particularly relevant.
Some familiarity with the celebrated characterization of halting probabilities as the Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals will also be useful. This well-known result was a consequence of the cumulative effort of Solovay [36] , Calude, Hertling, Khoussainov, and Wang [10] , and Kučera and Slaman [22] . A summary of basic facts about the representation of open Σ 0 n classes of streams as Σ 0 n prefix-free sets of strings and the characterization of their measures as the 0 (n) -left c.e. reals can be found in Reference [2] . If Q is a set of strings, then we let [[Q]] be the set of streams that have a prefix in Q. Moreover, given a class C of streams, we let μ (C) denote the Lebesgue measure of C.
As we indicated early in Section 1, our Turing machine model is the standard machine M with a one-way read-only input tape, a working tape and a one-way write-only output tape that is initially blank and on which the output is printed in binary contiguously (i.e., without leaving blanks between two bits) by a head that moves only to the right. Here the contents of the input tape X can be treated as an oracle or, alternatively, as a random variable, in which case we talk about randomized or probabilistic machines and computations. In this case, M (X ) denotes the contents of the output tape when the machine is run indefinitely. Alternatively, the reader may think in terms of monotone machines such as those used in Levin in References [23, 24] to give a definition of the algorithmic complexity of finite objects (a similar notion was used earlier by Solomonoff [35] ). Let denote the prefix relation among strings. A monotone machine can be thought of as a Turing machine M operating on finite binary programs with the monotonicity property that if σ τ , M (σ ) ↓, and M (τ ) ↓, then M (σ ) M (τ ). In this case, given an infinite binary stream X , we let M (X ) denote the supremum of M (σ ) for all prefixes σ of X . The machines constructed in Section 3.2 are best thought of as monotone machines. In any case, the underlying notion is that of an infinitary computation, which is performed over an infinite number of stages and where the output is either a binary string or a binary stream (i.e., an infinite binary sequence). A Turing machine is universal if it can simulate any other Turing machine with a constant overhead on the input tape. Let * denote the concatenation of stings. Given an effective list (M e ) of all oracle machines, an oracle machine U is universal if there exists a computable function e → σ e from numbers into a prefix-free set of strings such that U (σ e * X )[s] = M e (X )[s] for all e, X , s, where "[s]" indicates the state of the preceding computation after s many steps. For the case of monotone machines, the definition of universality is analogous. 5 Given an oracle Turing machine M, we consider properties of oracles X of the type P (X ) : the output M (X ) belongs to a class C.
The probability of such a property P with respect to an oracle machine M is simply the measure of the set of oracles X that have the property P. When we talk about the universal probability of a property P, we mean the probability of P with respect to a universal oracle Turing machine. This is the formal context for our main result, Theorem 1.1, which refers to the property that M (X ) generates an infinite computable binary stream as its output. In Section 2.1, the reader may find various examples of different properties P with respect to which the universal probabilities have been characterized.
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More special results and notions will be defined and cited in the text, when we need them. For example, we make use of relatively recent results from Hirschfeldt, Nies, and Stephan [19] as well as Barmpalias and Lewis-Pye [4] . For a more comprehensive background in the area between computability theory and algorithmic randomness, we refer the reader to the monographs Downey and Hirschfeldt [17] and Nies [30] , while Calude [11] has an information-theoretic perspective. Odifreddi [31, 32] is a standard reference in classical computability theory while Li and Vitányi [25] is a standard reference in the theory of Kolmogorov complexity (which provides another facet of algorithmic randomness).
ALGORITHMIC RANDOMNESS OF PROBABILITIES
We give some context for our main result and demonstrate its uniqueness in this line of research.
Previous Work-Randomness by Maximality
Since Chaitin's work many more examples of random numbers have been exhibited as probabilities of certain properties of various models of universal machines. A major influence in this line of work was a series of articles by Becher and her collaborators (e.g., [5, 6, 8] ), while the authors of the present article recently pushed this line of work to obtain complete characterizations of such probabilities in terms of algorithmic randomness in Reference [2] . 6 Although the arguments employed in these proofs of randomness may seem varied (some expressed in terms of initial segment complexity and some in terms of statistical tests), they all follow a general paradigm, which we may call randomness by maximality. For example, given a property P of a certain arithmetical complexity, one shows that the probability that a universal oracle Turing machine will have P when it runs on a random oracle is algorithmically random with respect to all statistical tests of the same arithmetical complexity as P.
Note that the arithmetical complexity of the given property automatically imposes an analogous upper bound on the level of the algorithmic randomness that the associated probability possesses. Hence, in this methodology, one shows that the probability of the property P is as algorithmically random as it can possibly be, given its arithmetical complexity, hence the name randomness by maximality.
Such a plan can often be carried out, as it is elaborated on in Reference [2] , by embedding a member of the universal Martin-Löf test of the respective arithmetical complexity into an oracle Turing machine M in such a way that the class of oracles X that make the computation M (X ) satisfy property P is identical to the class of oracles X that fail the respective Martin-Löf test. 7 This methodology (and its counterpart in terms of initial segment complexity) has produced many results of the form the probability of property P that lies at the nth level of arithmetical complexity is algorithmically random with respect to all statistical tests of the same arithmetical complexity.
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For example, halting is a Σ 0 1 property, and the halting probability of a universal machine is random with respect to all unrelativized (hence Σ 0 1 ) Martin-Löf tests, also called 1-random. Similarly, Σ 0 2 properties (e.g., infinite/finite output) often produce 2-random probabilities (e.g., References [2, 6] ), Σ 0 3 properties (e.g., almost everywhere totality of computed function) often produce 3-random probabilities (e.g., References [2, 5] ), and some Σ 0 4 properties (e.g., universality) produce 4-random probabilities [3] . In most of these cases, this maximality approach also allows for a complete characterization of the probabilities considered in terms of algorithmic definability and randomness.
Despite all these examples, it has been noticed on several occasions that the probability of a property with respect to the universal Turing machine may not necessarily have the maximum algorithmic randomness that its arithmetical complexity allows. For example, Becher, Figueira, Grigorieff, and Miller [7] showed that for any n > 1, the probability that the universal oracle Turing machine will halt and output a string in a given Σ 0 n -complete set (this is a Σ 0 n -complete property) is not n-random. A few more such counterexamples are briefly discussed in Reference [2] .
Restricted Halting Probabilities and Differences
In this section, we discuss some metamathematical issues that are related to universal halting probabilities. During this discussion, the machine model is the oracle Turing machine, where the oracle X is regarded as the input and the output is a finite string, which is produced after a computation has halted. 8 Following Chaitin's widely publicized metamathematical considerations (mainly based on References [12, 13] ), part of the appeal of the halting probability comes from its connections with formal systems of mathematics. For example, if we effectively identify binary strings with statements in Peano arithmetic, the set A of theorems of Peano arithmetic is a c.e. set of strings. Chaitin [14] observed that in this case the probability Ω(A) that the universal machine will produce a theorem of Peano arithmetic is a left-c.e. Martin-Löf random number. Let us now consider the set B of arithmetical sentences that are undecidable in the formal system of Peano arithmetic, thar is, neither they nor their negation is provable from the axioms of Peano arithmetic. The set B is Π 0 1 and by Gödel's incompleteness theorem, it is nonempty. Which properties are satisfied by the probability Ω(B) that the randomized universal machine will produce an undecidable sentence? In Reference Barmpalias and Lewis-Pye [4] , answering a problem from Reference [28, Question 8.10] and Reference [7, 8] , it was shown that for any nonempty Π 0 1 set B, the number Ω(B) is both left-c.e. and Martin-Löf random. Applying this result to the set of undecidable sentences, we get the following counterintuitive fact.
Theorem 2.1. The probability that the randomized universal machine outputs an undecidable sentence is a left-c.e. Martin-Löf random real.
The contrast here is that, although we cannot effectively enumerate the undecidable sentences, we can enumerate the left Dedekind cut of the probability of an undecidable output, just like we did for the probability of a theorem of Peano arithmetic (the latter being computably enumerable). If we recall the characterization of universal halting probabilities as the Martin-Löf random left-c.e. reals, then it follows that the probability of an undecidable sentence with respect to any universal machine U is equal to the probability of a theorem of Peano arithmetic with respect to another universal machine V .
We can continue this discussion briefly by considering the probability that the randomized universal machine will output a true arithmetical sentence. Becher, Figueira, Grigorieff, and Miller [7] showed that the halting probability restricted to any Σ 0 n -complete set is Martin-Löf random 9 and not n-random. Since the set of n-quantifier arithmetical sentences is an example of a Σ 0 n -complete set, we have the following. Theorem 2.2 (Becher, Figueira, Grigorieff, and Miller [7] ). For each n > 1, the probability that the randomized universal machine outputs a true n-quantifier arithmetical sentence is Martin-Löf random but not n-random.
Two questions present themselves at this point. First, what about the probability that the randomized universal machine outputs a true arithmetical sentence (of any number of quantifiers)? Is it algorithmically random, and if yes, then how much? Second, is the probability in Theorem 2.2 Martin-Löf random with respect to ∅ or ∅ for sufficiently large n? These questions do not seem to be amenable to the analysis in Reference [7] . We leave them open for consideration, and move on to our main topic.
This discussion is interesting as a continuation of Chaitin's metamathematical considerations, but its main purpose is to provide some additional context for our main result, Theorem 1.1. In particular, Theorem 2.1 shows that even in situations where the maximality paradigm of Section 2.1 does not apply (e.g., when the property in question is definable by the disjunction of a Σ 0 n and a Π 0 n formula) it could still be the case that its universal probability is necessarily maximally random (in the case of a Σ 0 n ∨ Π 0 n formula, this means n-random). 10 Hence Theorem 1.1 does not have a precedent in this line of research, and all these examples reveal the wide variety of algorithmic behavior that the probability of a property of the universal machine can have.
PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.1. First, in Section 3.1, we show the first part of Theorem 1.1, namely that we can express the universal probability of a computable output as the difference of two 0 -left-c.e. reals. Section 3.2 contains the first step towards the converse of our main result. We show that the probability of a computable output can be any 0 -left-c.e. or 0 -right-c.e. real provided that we choose an appropriate machine. Note, however, that we do not yet guarantee this for a universal Turing machine. The first step toward the latter conclusion is made in Lemma 3.8 of the next section, which shows that the universal probability of a computable output can be chosen to be any Martin-Löf random 0 -left-c.e. real. We conclude Section 3.3 with the proof of the latter part of Theorem 1.1, in an argument that uses all the previous lemmas.
The Probability of a Computable Output as the Difference of 0 -left-c.e. Reals
We are interested in the measure of the oracles X such that the output M (X ) is total and computable. Let TOT(M ) denote the Π 0 2 class of streams X such that M (X ) is total. Also let INCTOT(M ) be the class of streams X such that M (X ) is total and incomputable. Then we are interested in the measure of the class
(3.1.1)
We note that INCTOT(M ) is not generally definable with two quantifiers, so the above class appears more complex than we would ideally wish. Despite this, we show that the measure of this class can be expressed as the difference of two 0 -left-c.e. reals. 9 It is worth noting that Kobayashi [20] had obtained a weaker version of this result for a restricted notion of Σ 0 ncompleteness that he called constant overhead completeness. We also note that the result in Becher, Figueira, Grigorieff, and Miller [7] applies for optimal machines in general, not just universal machines. 10 Theorem 2.1 is an example of this phenomenon for n = 1, while a relativization of it produces examples for any n.
Recall that an oracle X is a base for Martin-Löf randomness if it is computed by another oracle that is Martin-Löf random relative to X . Also note that by Hirschfeldt, Nies, and Stephan [19] , bases for Martin-Löf randomness are computable from the halting problem. On the other hand, 2-random streams do not compute any incomputable set that is also computable from the halting problem. This latter statement follows from the fact that the class of oracles that compute a Δ 0 2 set X form a Σ 0 3 class, which is null when X is noncomputable (by Reference [15] , also see Reference [18] ). These facts will be used in the proof of the following lemma. Proof. If α, β are 0 -left-c.e. reals in (0, 1), then let q ∈ (max{α, β }, 1) be a rational number and note that
. Hence the difference of two 0 -left-c.e. reals in (0, 1) can be written as the difference of two 0right-c.e. reals in (0, 1). Hence it suffices to show that the measure of (3.1.1) can be written as the difference of two 0 -right-c.e. reals in (0, 1).
Note that while TOT(M ) is a Π 0 2 class, INCTOT(M ) is a Π 0 3 class, so we need to find a simpler class that has the same measure as INCTOT(M ). Let (V i ) be a universal Martin-Löf test and define
This is the class of streams X such that M (X ) is total and X is not Martin-Löf random relative to M (X ). Observe that INCTOT * (M ) is a Π 0 2 class. If we show that for every 2-random X we have is the measure of (3.1.1). Since the above two classes are Π 0 2 , their measures are 0 -right-c.e. reals, so this proves the statement. It remains to prove (3.1.2).
First, suppose that X is 2-random and X ∈ INCTOT. Then, by definition, M (X ) is total and incomputable. If X ∩ i V M (X ) i , then X would be Martin-Löf random relative to the incomputable set M (X ) that it computes, so M (X ) would be a base for Martin-Löf randomness. But we know from Reference [19] that such sets are Δ 0 2 , and we also know that no 2-random real computes a noncomputable Δ 0 2 set. Hence we arrived at a contradiction, which means that
. Then M (X ) must be incomputable, otherwise X would not be 2-random (or even 1-random). So X belongs to INCTOT. This concludes the proof of (3.1.2) and the proof of the lemma.
A Turing Machine for Each 0 -left-c.e. and each 0 -right-c.e. Real
Here we make the first step towards the proof of the second part of Theorem 1.1. We wish to show that given any α that is either a 0 -left-c.e. or a 0 -right-c.e. real, there exists an oracle Turing machine M such that the measure of TOT(M ) − INCTOT(M ) is α. To do this, we use the fact that every 0 -left-c.e. real is the weight of a Σ 0 2 prefix-free set of strings. 11 Given such a set of strings, we wish to produce a special oracle Turing machine M that has the desired property (namely M (X ) being total and computable) exactly on streams that have (alternatively those that do not have) a prefix in the Σ 0 2 prefix-free set of strings. Although its not possible to achieve this in both cases, we will be successful almost everywhere, in the probabilistic sense, which is sufficient for our purposes.
We need the following fact. We call (V s ) a canonical Σ 0 2 approximation to U . Proof. Given U , there exists a c.e. operator W such that W ∅ = U . We can modify the enumeration of W (obtaining a modified W ) with respect to a computable enumeration (∅ s ) of ∅ , so if n ∈ ∅ s+1 − ∅ s for some number n and stage s, any number m that is in W
In other words, the enumeration of W ∅ follows the enumeration of W ∅ , except that it delays the enumeration of certain numbers until a stage where the associated segment of ∅ remains stable between the current and the previous stages. 12 Let U s = W ∅ s s and let V s contain the minimal strings in U s . Clearly, all V s are finite and prefix-free sets of strings. A true enumeration into ∅ is an enumeration of a number n into ∅ at stage s such that ∅ s n = ∅ n . A true stage is a stage s at which a true enumeration occurs. Clearly, there exist infinitely many true enumerations and stages. By the choice of W , we have that if s is a true stage, then U s ⊆ U , and since U is prefix-free so is U s , and thus we have V s = U s ⊆ U . Moreover, if σ ∈ U , then σ ∈ U s for all but finitely many stages s, which means that σ has a prefix in V s for all but finitely many s. Finally, by the hat trick, if σ has a prefix in V s for all but finitely many stages s, then we necessarily have σ ∈ U , because V t ⊆ U for infinitely many stages t. Lemma 3.4 . Suppose that Q is a Σ 0 2 prefix-free set of strings. Then there exists an oracle Turing machine M such that M (X ) is total for all X , and, for every Martin-Löf random real X , the following clauses are equivalent:
(a) M (X ) is total and computable; (b) M (X ) is total and M (X ) = η * 0 ω for some string η;
Proof. Given a Σ 0 2 prefix-free set of strings Q, we use Lemma 3.3 and consider a canonical Σ 0 2 approximation (Q s ) to Q. Note that a string σ belongs to Q if and only if it has a prefix in Q s for almost all s. We will use (Q s ) to build an oracle machine M with the required properties. We may assume that for each s, the strings in Q s have length less than s. We build M as a monotone machine. Let λ denote the empty string. At stage 0, we define M (λ) = λ. At stage s + 1, we define M (σ ) for all strings of length i ≤s 2 i = 2 s+1 − 1. Hence at stage 1, we define M (σ ) for all strings σ of length 1; at stage 2, we define M (σ ) for all strings of length 3; and so on. Moreover, we ensure that the length of M (σ ) is equal to the length of σ . Hence at stage s + 1, for each string σ of length 2 s+1 − 1 with a prefix τ of length 2 s − 1, we need to determine 2 s additional bits that we can suffix to M (τ ) to define M (σ ).
At stage s + 1, do the following for each string σ of length 2 s+1 − 1 and its prefix τ of length 2 s − 1. If there is a prefix of σ in Q s , then let M (σ ) = M (τ ) * 0 2 s . Otherwise, let M (σ ) = M (τ ) * ρ, where ρ is the string such that σ |M (τ ) | * ρ = σ , that is, the last |σ | − |M (τ )| many bits of σ . This completes the construction of M.
Clearly M is a monotone machine and M (X ) is total for all streams X . Moreover, by the construction and the properties of (Q s ), we have that if σ ∈ Q, then for each X extending σ there exists a string ρ such that M (X ) = ρ * 0 ω .
Indeed, if σ ∈ Q, then there exists a stage s 0 > 0 such that σ ∈ Q s for all s > s 0 . In this case, for each X that has prefix σ , the construction gives that M (X ) = ρ * 0 ω for some string ρ of length 2 s 0 −1 − 1.
Recall that there are infinitely many s such that Q s ⊆ Q. Hence if X does not have a prefix in Q, then there are infinitely many stages s such that X do not have a prefix in Q s . Let (φ e ) be a computable enumeration of all partial computable functions, and for each e, s let V s+1 (e) be • the set of strings η of length 2 s+1 − 1 such that η(i) = φ e (i) for all i ∈ [2 s , 2 s+1 ), if φ e 2 s +1 is defined; • the empty set, otherwise.
By the construction, we have μ (V s+1 (e)) ≤ 2 −s for each s, e, and V s+1 (e) is uniformly c.e. in e, s. Hence (V s+1 (e)) is a Martin-Löf test for each e. Hence if X is Martin-Löf random and e ∈ N, then X has a prefix in V s+1 (e) for only finitely many s.
Now we can show that if X is Martin-Löf random and does not have a prefix in Q, then M (X ) is not computable. Indeed, if φ e = M (X ), then at each stage s + 1 such that X does not have a prefix in Q s , the construction would define the last 2 s many digits of M (X 2 s+1 − 1) to be the last 2 s many digits of X 2 s+1 − 1, which means that the latter coincides with the last 2 s many digits of φ e 2 s +1 −1 . But this means that X ∈ V s+1 (e). Hence by the assumption that φ e = M (X ) and X [[Q]], we deduce that X ∈ [[V s+1 (e)]] for infinitely many s. Since (V s+1 (e)) is a Martin-Löf test this means that X is not Martin-Löf random. We have shown that if X is Martin-Löf random and X [[Q]], then M(X) is not computable.
Hence for almost all X in the complement of [[Q]], we have that M (X ) is noncomputable, while for all X in [[Q]] the image M (X ) is computable. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
By the Kraft-Chaitin theorem it follows (see Reference [2] for a detailed proof) that given any e ∈ N, any string ρ of length e and any 0 -left-c.e. real α ∈ (0, 1 − 2 −e ) there exists a Σ 0 2 prefix-free set S of strings that are incompatible with ρ and μ ([[S]]) = α.
(3.
2.1)
Here incompatibility is with regard to the prefix relation: A string η is incompatible with a string ρ if η ρ and η is neither a prefix nor an extension of ρ . Lemma 3.4 in combination with (3.2.1) implies the following item, which will be used in the argument of Section 3.3.
Corollary 3.5. If e ∈ N, ρ is a string of length e and α is a 0 -left-c.e. real in (0, 1 − 2 −e ), then there exists an oracle Turing machine M such that M (σ ) is the empty string for any string σ that is compatible with ρ and such that the probability that M (X ) is computable is exactly α.
Finally, we want a corresponding statement for 0 -right-c.e. reals, which we can get from an analog to Lemma 3.4 for Π 0 2 sets. Note that this case is much simpler and gives a stronger result (with the claimed equivalence being satisfied by every real), which we formulate as follows. Lemma 3.6. Suppose that Q is a Σ 0 2 prefix-free set of strings. Then there exists an oracle Turing machine M such that the following clauses are equivalent:
for each real X .
Proof. Let (Q s ) be a canonical enumeration of Q and construct M as follows. At stage s + 1, for each σ that does not have a prefix in Q s define M (σ ) = 0 |σ | . Clearly, M is monotone and hence well defined. If X has a prefix σ in Q, then there exists a stage s 0 such that σ ∈ Q s for all s > s 0 . In this case, M (X n ) will not be defined for any n > s 0 , so M (X ) is not total. For the other direction, assume that X does not have a prefix in Q. Then there are infinitely many stages s such that X does not have a prefix in Q s ; for such s, the construction will define M (X s ) = 0 s at stage s + 1. Hence M (X ) is total and equal to 0 ω . Finally if M (X ) is total, then necessarily M (X ) = 0 ω , which concludes the proof of the equivalence.
The analog of (3.2.1) for 0 -right-c.e. reals is as follows:
given any e ∈ N, any string ρ of length e, and any 0 -right-c.e. real β ∈ (2 −e , 1) there exists a Σ 0 2 prefix-free set S of strings t hat are incompatible with ρ and
Note that since 1 − β is a 0 -left-c.e. real whenever β is a 0 -right-c.e. real, (3.2.2) is a direct consequence of (3.2.1). Lemma 3.4 in combination with (3.2.2) implies the following item, which will be used in the argument of Section 3.3.
Corollary 3.7. If e ∈ N, ρ is a string of length e, and β is a 0 -right-c.e. real in (2 −e , 1), then there exists an oracle Turing machine M such that M (σ ) is the empty string, for any string σ that is compatible with ρ and such that the probability that the output M (X ) of M on oracle X is total and computable is exactly β.
We keep Corollaries 3.5 and 3.7 and use them as ingredients in the argument of the next section.
A Universal Machine for Each Difference of 0 -left-c.e. Reals
The next step towards the proof of the second part of Theorem 1.1 is to produce universal oracle Turing machines with prescribed probability of a computable outcome. This is the main difference with the previous sections, and this is where the use of Martin-Löf randomness is most essential. We are two steps away from the final proof. First, we deal with the specific task of producing a universal machine such that the relevant probability is any given 2-random 0 -left-c.e. real in the unit interval (by symmetry the same holds for any given 2-random 0 -right-c.e. real).
In the proof below, we use the following fact by Kučera and Slaman [22] :
given any 0 -left-c.e. 2-random real α and any 0 -left-c.e. real β, there exists e 0 ∈ N such that α − 2 −e · β is a 0 -left-c.e. real for all e > e 0 . This fact was proved in Reference [22] for left-c.e. reals and 1-randomness, but it readily relativizes to any oracle. The argument below is based on an idea from Calude, Hertling, Khoussainov, and Wang [10] .
Lemma 3.8. Given any 2-random 0 -left-c.e. real γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a universal oracle machine V such that the probability that the output V (X ) of V with oracle X is total and computable is γ .
Proof. Let V 0 be a universal oracle machine. Then, by Lemma 3.1, there exist 0 -left-c.e. reals α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that V 0 (X ) is computable with probability α − β. By (3.3.1) there exists some e such that
In this case, note that γ − 2 −e · (α − β ) is a 0 -left-c.e. real in (0, 1). By Corollary 3.5, consider an oracle Turing machine M such that M (σ ) is undefined for all σ that are compatible with 0 e , and the probability that M (X ) is total and computable is γ − 2 −e · (α − β ). Then, for each σ , define V (0 e * σ ) = V 0 (σ ) and for every τ that is incompatible with 0 e define V (τ ) = M (τ ). Then the probability that V (X ) is total and computable is the sum of probability that M (X ) is total and computable, plus 2 −e times the probability that V 0 (X ) is total and computable. Hence, V (X ) is total and computable with probability γ − 2 −e · (α − β ) + 2 −e · (α − β ) = γ , which completes the proof of the lemma.
In the following final step of our argument, we are going to use a fact from Rettinger and Zheng [34] that also holds in relativized form as follows:
If α, β are 0 -left-c.e. reals and α − β is 2-random, then α − β is either a 0 -left-c.e. real or a 0 -right-c.e. real.
3.2)
Another observation we need is that the sum of a 2-random 0 -left-c.e. real with any 0 -left-c.e. real is 2-random. This is a relativization of the fact, originally proved by Demuth [16] , that the sum of a 1-random left-c.e. real with any left-c.e. real is 1-random. We also note that any difference of two 0 -left-c.e. reals can be written as a difference of two 2-random 0 -left-c.e. reals. real is 2-random. 13 The key ingredient of the proof of Lemma 3.9 is a result from Reference [4] , which says that the difference between a d.c.e. real that is not 1-random and a 1-random left-c.e. real is a 1-random right-c.e. real. In relativized form this says that if α, β, γ are 0 -left-c.e. reals, γ is 2-random and α − β is not 2-random,
Finally, we also use the elementary fact that if α is a 2-random 0 -left-c.e. real then for every e the number 2 −e · α is a 2-random 0 -left-c.e. real. Lemma 3.9. Let α, β be 0 -left-c.e. reals such that α − β ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists a universal Turing machine M such that M (X ) is computable with probability exactly α − β.
Proof. By (3.3.3), without loss of generality, we may assume that α, β are 2-random. First we consider the case where α − β is 2-random. In this case, by (3.3.2) α − β is either a 0 -left-c.e. or a 0 -right-c.e. real. In the first case, the result follows from Lemma 3.8. Otherwise, α − β is 0 -rightc.e. and we can use Lemma 3.8 to get a universal Turing machine V such that the probability of V (X ) being computable is a 0 -left-c.e. real δ . Also let e be a number such that (α − β ) − 2 −e · δ ∈ (2 −e , 1) and note that the real (α − β ) − 2 −e · δ is a 0 -right-c.e. real with respect to which the number e satisfies the condition of Corollary 3.7. So we can use Corollary 3.7 to get a machine N such that N (σ ) is undefined for any string σ that is compatible with 0 e (namely the string consisting of e many 0s) and such that the probability that N (X ) is computable is (α − β ) − 2 −e · δ . Now we can define M (ρ) = N (ρ) for every ρ that is incompatible with 0 e and M (0 e * σ ) = V (σ ) for all σ . Then the probability that M (X ) is computable is the sum of the probability that N (X ) is computable, plus 2 −e times the probability that V (X ) is computable. Hence M (X ) is computable with probability ((α − β ) − 2 −e · δ ) + 2 −e · δ = α − β .
It remains to consider the case where α − β is not 2-random. Consider the universal machine V as above, so the probability of V (X ) being computable is a 2-random 0 -left-c.e. real δ . In this case, by (3.3.4), the number α − β − 2 −e · δ is 0 -right-c.e. for every e. Let e be such that α − β − 2 −e · δ ∈ (2 −e , 1) and use Corollary 3.7 to obtain a machine N such that N (σ ) is undefined for any string σ that is compatible with 0 e and N (X ) is computable with probability α − β − 2 −e · δ . Now define M (σ ) = N (σ ) for every string σ that is incompatible with 0 e , and M (0 e * ρ) = V (ρ) for all ρ.
Then the probability that M (X ) is computable is the sum of the probability that N (X ) is computable, plus 2 −e times the probability that V (X ) is computable. Hence M (X ) is computable with probability (α − β − 2 −e · δ ) + 2 −e · δ = α − β, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.1.
AN APPLICATION OF OUR ANALYSIS
The methodology we developed in Section 3 is applicable to other problems in this area. As a demonstration, we give the following characterization of the universal probabilities that the output ends in a stream of 0s, as a corollary of the previous analysis. Theorem 4.1. If V is a (universal) oracle Turing machine, then the probability that V (X ) = ρ * 0 ω for some string ρ is α − β for some 0 -left-c.e. reals α, β. Conversely, given α, β as above such that α − β ∈ (0, 1), there exists a universal oracle Turing machine V such that the probability that V (X ) = ρ * 0 ω for some string ρ is α − β.
The first part follows from the part that the class in question is the difference of two Π 0 2 classes. For the second part, note that Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.6 imply that the probability that M (X ) is computable equals the probability that M (X ) = ρ * 0 ω for some string ρ. Therefore Corollary 3.5 and Corollary 3.7 hold for the probability that M (X ) = ρ * 0 ω for some string ρ, in place of the probability that M (X ) is computable. This means that the machines M constructed in the various cases of the proof of Lemma 3.9 also prove the second clause of Theorem 4.1.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have characterized the universal probabilities of a computable output as the class of differences of 0 -left-c.e. reals in (0, 1). Our methodology, as well as the characterization itself, are novel in the context of existing research on the initial segment complexity of universal probabilities and depend significantly on a number of non-trivial results from algorithmic randomness. We also demonstrated in the last section that these ideas are applicable to related problems regarding universal probabilities.
